

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 EA-06 IO-06 NSC-05
SP-02 INR-05 PM-03 DODE-00 CIAE-00 ACDA-10 L-01
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P R 140706Z MAY 78

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8310

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 4547

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ISLAMABAD ADDED AS INFO ADDRESSEE)

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, AF, PK, TU, IR

SUBJ: POLICY PROSPECTS FOR NEAR FUTURE IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A) TEHRAN 4521 B) STATE 119925

1. AS REPORTED REF A, I DUTIFULLY GAVE FOREIGN MINISTER KHALAT-BARY GIST OF REF B, WHICH REPRESENTED PRELIMINARY WASHINGTON VIEWS ON NEW STRATEGIC SITUATION RESULTING FROM COUP IN
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AFGHANISTAN. GIVEN THE REGENCY OF EVENTS IN KABUL AND THE DIFFICULTY IN DISCERNING THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN, IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLY PRETTY THIN GRUEL.

2. IN XAMINING OUR POLICY PROSPECTS FOR THE NEAR FUTURE, I AM CONCERNED THAT, TO ALL EXTERNAL APPEARACNES, OUR GRUEL IS GOIN TO GET EVEN THINNER. AS WE LOOK AHEAD, THE

ACTIONS WHICH WE WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE, AND THE INACTION WHICH WILL BE FORCED UPON US, ALL CONSPIRE TO CREATE EXACTLY THE WRONG SIGNALS TO MOSCOW AND OTHER INCIPIENT MALEFACTORS AS WELL AS TO THOSE FRIENDS WHICH MAY FEEL THREATENED AND INSECURE IN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. IT IS OBVIOUS, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL THAT AFGHANISTAN REPRESENTS FOR SOVIET MISCHIEF-MAKING IN THIS REGION, THAT WE SHOULD BE MOVING TO STRENGTHEN NOT ONLY THE POLITICAL WILL BUT ALSO THE MATERIAL MEANS OF OUR LOCAL FRIENDS TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE THEIR INTEGRITIES. ABOVE ALL, THIS MEANS THAT WE SHOULD ACT TO ENHANCE THE STRENGTH OF THE REGIONAL MEMBERS OF CENTO.

4. HOWEVER, IF WE EXAMINE OUR POSSIBILITIES FOR DOING JUST THAT IN THE NEAR TERM, THEY LOOK VERY BLEAK INDEED. IN THE CASE OF TURKEY, ALL REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON INDICATE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR GETTING THE CONGRESS TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE PROVISION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE TURKS ARE VERY DIM. IN THE CASE OF PAKISTAN, THE INHIBITIONS ON ASSISTANCE ARISING FROM THE PAKISTANI INSISTENCE ON ITS REPROCESSING PLANT SEEM BOUND TO STYMIE ANY EFFECTIVE AID TO THAT COUNTRY. WHILE THE PROSPECTS FOR IRAN SEEM SOMEWHAT BRIGHTER THAN FOR THE OTHER TWO, CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF THIS COUNTRY IN THE UNITED STATES MAY BECOME INCREASINGLY AND NEGATIVELY PREJUDICED BY THE POLITICAL UNREST BEING MANIFESTED HERE.
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5. IN SHORT, UNLESS WASHINGTON TAKES ACTION TO TURN THESE SITUATIONS AROUND, WE ARE GOING TO FIND OURSELVES IN A POSTURE OF HAND-WRINGING DESPAIR WHICH MAY ENCOURAGE MOSCOW TO MOVE MORE SMARTLY AND MORE RECKLESSLY TO STIR UP TROUBLE AMONG THE PUSHTUNS AND THE BALUCHIS, USING THEIR NEW AFGHANISTANI ASSETS MUCH SOONER THAN WE ANTICIPATE.

6. IT THEREFORE SEEMS TO ME THAT WASHINGTON NEEDS TO ORGANIZE AN EFFORT TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION IN AN INTEGRATED WAY AND MOVE BEYOND THE CASE-BY-CASE TREATMENT WHICH HAS HITHERTO CHARACTERIZED OUR ACTIONS IN THIS AREA. THIS REQUIRES AN EDUCATIONAL EFFORT WITHIN OUR OWN GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH THE CONGRESS, TO DEMONSTRATE THE LARGER IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK TO THE PERSIAN GULF AND ULTIMATELY TO THE ENERGY SUPPLIES OF WEST EUROPE AND JAPAN IF THE CENTO TIER CRUMBLES. IT REQUIRES AN INTERNATIONAL CONCERT SO THAT OUR NATO ALLIES, JAPAN, AND EVEN CHINA ARE SENSITIZED TO THE NEED FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE STABILIZATION OF THIS AREA. AND IT REQUIRES A CAREFUL ORDERING OF OUR OWN POLICY PRIORITIES, SO THAT WE DO NOT JEOPARDIZE VITAL INTERESTS BY MINDLESS PURSUIT OF MERELY DESIRABLE ONES.

7. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SORT OF COMPLEX ISSUE WHICH NEEDS TO
BE SURMOUNTED SOONEST, I OFFER THE PAKISTAN REPROCESSING

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P R 140706Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8311
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 4547

LIMDIS

PLANT. WHILE IT HAS SPORADICALLY ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION
OF SENIOR POLICY MAKERS, IT HAS BEEN LARGELY ADDRESSED,
ON OUR PART, BY TECHNICAL EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR
POLICY. WE NEED TO PULL TOGETHER AN APPROACH TO THIS
PROBLEM WHICH WILL INVOLVE OURSELVES, THE FRENCH, THE IRANIANS,
THE INDIANS, AND POSSIBLY EVEN THE CHINESE. THERE MUST
BE MORE THAN JUST A MORAL DISSUASION OF THE PAKISTANIS FROM
THEIR FOLLY. THEY MUST BE PRESENTED WITH AN OPPORTUNITY
TO BE ABLE TO CHANGE THEIR PLANS IN RETURN FOR CERTAIN
BENEFITS THAT MAKE SUCH A CHANGE PALATABLE. THIS MAY INVOLVE
ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO BHUTTO, UNDERTAKING OF A SPECIFIC
QUALITY BY INDIA, AID MEASURES FROM A BROADENED CONSORTIUM,
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AND PERHAPS SOME FIRM DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE
AFGHANS.

8. MY POINT, HOWEVER, IS THAT ALL OF THIS NEEDS TO BE PERCEIVED
AS BEING PART OF A WIDER AND DEEPER EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN AND
STIFFEN THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR FRIENDS IN THIS REGION TO RESIST
THE DANGERS WHICH THEY FEAR AND TO PRESERVE THE INTERESTS WHICH
ARE VITAL TO NATO AND JAPAN. WE AND OUR ALLIES AND OUR FRIENDS
NEED TO BE SEEN AS GALVANIZED RATHER THAN ANESTHETIZED. THIS
DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE NEED OVER-REACT IN AFGHANISTAN OR "WRITE
IT OFF". IT DOES MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY
TAKE ACTION TO UNDO THE CONTORTED POSTURE OF INACTION INTO
WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TWISTED BY EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW YEARS
AND MAKE OURSELVES CAPABLE OF LEADING A POSITIVE
POLICY IN THIS REGION.
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LIMDIS

CORRECTED COPY (ISLAMABAD ADDED AS INFO ADDRESSEE)

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BENEFITS THAT MEK SUCH A CHANGE PALATABLE. THIS MAY INVOLVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO BHUTTO, UNDERTAKING OF A SPECIFIC QUALITY BY INDIA, AID MEASURES FROM A BROADENED CONSORTIUM, AND PERHAPS SOME FIRM DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE AFGHANS.

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